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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE SERVICEmAN'S RIGHT TO A CIVILIAN4
TRIAL FOR A NON-SERVICE CONNECTED CRIIE
Petitioner was a sergeant in the United States Army, stationed in Hawaii.
One evening, on a pass, and in civilian clothes, he broke into a hotel room,
assaulted and attempted to rape the occupant and fled. A security guard
apprehended him and turned him over to the city police, who, upon learning
of his military status, turned him over to the military authorities. He was
charged with attempted rape, housebreaking, and assault with intent to rape,
in violation of Articles 80, 130, and 134 respectively of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.' Petitioner was convicted on all counts by a court-martial
and sentenced to ten years imprisonment at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay
and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. The conviction was affirmed
by the Army Board of Review and the United States Court of Military Ap-
peals. While in prison, petitioner filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court alleging that the court-martial was without juris-
diction to try him for non-military offenses committed off-base and off-duty. The
district court denied petitioner relief without considering the issue on the merits
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 2 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari8 and per Mr. Justice Douglas, held, that a court-martial's exercise
of jurisdiction over a nonservice connected crime is violative of the fifth and
sixth amendments of the Constitution and contrary to the history of military
jurisdiction. Therefore, petitioner was entitled to a trial by a civilian court.
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
The judicial system of the Armed Forces is provided for in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.4 Some basic and necessary differences exist between
the military and civilian judicial systems. The two systems developed and
1. Article 80 of the Uniform Code of Military justice, 10 U.S.C. § 880 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as U.CM.J.] provides:
(a)An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under this chapter,
amounting to more than mere preparation and tending, even though failing to
effect its commission, is an attempt to commit that offense.
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts to commit any offense
punishable by this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, unless
otherwise specifically prescibed.
Article 130 (10 U.S.C. Sec. 930) provides:
Any person subject to this chapter who unlawfully enters the building or structure
of another with intent to commit a criminal offense therein is guilty of house-
breaking and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Article 134 (10 U.S.C. Sec. 934) provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of
which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of
by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree
of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
2. O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968).
3. O'Callahan v. Parker, 393 U.S. 822 (1969).
4. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-935 (1964).
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exist separately. In Burns v. Wilson5 the Court, in recognizing these dif-
ferences said that:
Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate
and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial estab-
lishment. This Court has played no role in its development; we have
exerted no supervisory power over the courts which enforce it; the
rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to
meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the
civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise
balance to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers expressly en-
trusted that task to Congress.6
When discussing the problem of court-martial jurisdiction, one must keep in
mind that the primary function of a military is fighting. As the Court stated
in United States, ex rel. Toth v. Quarles:7
To the extent that those responsible for the performance of this
primary function are diverted from it by the necessity of trying
cases, the basic fighting purpose of armies is not served. . . . [I]t
still remains true that military tribunals have not been and prob-
ably never can be constituted in such a way that they can have
the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has deemed
essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts.8
Moreover, there is a great difference between trial-by-jury and trial by se-
lected members of the military forces. As stated in Reid v. Covert,9 a court-
martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice but remains to a
significant degree a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which
military discipline is preserved. The Court has recognized' ° that free coun-
tries throughout the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the
narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline
among troops in active service. Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution says
"The trial of all crimes except in cases of impeachment shall be by jury...."
In Ex parte Quirinn the Court said "[t]he object [of Art. III, Sec. 2] was
to preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all those cases in which it had been
recognized by the common law and in all cases of a like nature .. .in the
future."' 2 The early American practice of Military Law was derived from
the laws of England. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 established that
Parliament would have the power to define the jurisdictional limits of courts-
5. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
6. Id. at 140.
7. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
8. Id. at 17, 18.
9. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
10. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
11. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
12. Id. at 39; see also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 289 (1930); Ex parte
Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925); Calan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 548 (1888); Cum-
mings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
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martial.' s Originally, court-martial jurisdiction was narrowly confined to cer-
tain military offenses. The American Articles of War of 1776 established
this jurisdiction following the pattern of English law in the area. Nowhere
in the Articles, or its re-enactment in 1789, or its revision in 1806, was
jurisdiction asserted over non-military crimes or over crimes committed off-
post by off-duty members of the military. Article I, Sec. X of the 1776
Articles provided that:
Whenever any officer or soldier shall be accused of a capital crime,
or of having used violence, or committed any offense against the
persons or property of the people of the United States, such as is
punishable by the known laws of the land, the commanding officer
and the officers of every regiment, troop, or party, to which the
person(s) so accused shall belong are hereby required, upon ap-
plication duly made by or on behalf of, the party or parties injured
to use his utmost endeavors to deliver over such accused person(s)
to the civil magistrate and likewise to be aiding or assisting to the
officers of justice in apprehending and securing the person(s) so
accused, in order to bring them to trial ...
The model for the 1776 Articles, the British Articles of War, had contained
a similar provision to compel military compliance with the Constitutional
principle that all civil offenses committed by servicemen shall be tried by
civilian courts.14 The court-martial jurisdiction over civilian crimes com-
mitted in peacetime was' provided for by the revised Articles of War of
1916.5 These provided for jurisdiction over all offenses committed by mem-
bers of the Armed Forces even in time of peace, except that jurisdiction
over capital crimes (such as rape and murder) was limited to wartime.10
This continued the principle that in wartime, any offense committed by a
soldier is cognizable by a court-martial. Military courts do not have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over members of the military, even in wartime, for
violations of state laws.17 However, in Caldwell v. Parker,'8 the Court con-
ceded that Congress may provide that as the mere result of a declaration
of war, state authority over offenses committed by persons in service shall
be completely destroyed. The Court further said that the hostility of the
13. W. & M. C. 2.
14. WiNTHRop, lurTARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS 1446 (2d Ed. 1920).
15. Articles of War of 1916, 39 U.S. Stat. 650.
16. Article 93, Articles of War of 1916, 39 U.S. Stat. 650, 664:
Any person subject to military law who commits manslaughter, mayhem, arson,
burglary, robbery, larceny, embezzlement, perjury, assault with intent to commit
any felony, or assault with intent to do bodily harm, shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct.
Article 92, Articles of War of 1916, 39 U.S. Stat. 650, 664:
Any person subject to military law who commits murder or rape shall suffer death
or imprisonment for life, as a court-martial may direct; but no person shall
be tried by court-martial for murder or rape committed within the geographical
limits of the States of the Union and the District of Columbia in time of peace.
17. Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376 (1920).
18. Id.
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American people to military interference with the regular administration of
justice in the civil courts requires that such intention should not be ascribed
to Congress in the absence of clear and direct language to that effect. The
Articles of War provide that civil coirts are to have concurrent jurisdiction
with respect to violations of federal or state laws committed within the
geographical limits of the United States. In time of war, however, the Ar-
ticles give the military preference in the exercise of this jurisdiction.19
The Court saw a constitutional problem presented in O'Callahan, that
is, whether Congress can authorize courts-martial to decide, in peacetime,
cases dealing with capital or non-capital crimes committed by servicemen
within the United States, when the nature of the alleged crime is "civil"
in that it fails to have any substantial adverse effect upon the military.
The provisions of the 1776 Articles of War concerning the limitations on
peace-time jurisdiction of courts-martial over civil offenses were repeated
in the Articles of War of 1806.20 However, these limitations have slowly
disappeared. In 1863, during the Civil War, Congress authorized that
courts-martial would have jurisdiction over various civil crimes, regardless
of whether or not the order and discipline of the military was affected. This
authorization, however, extended the jurisdiction of courts-martial only in
time of war. The Articles of War of 1874 incorporated the 1863 law.21 The
1806 Articles concerning the delivery of military offenders to civil author-
ities were made inapplicable in time of war to conform to this.2 2 The 1916
Articles of War, passed during World War I, extended the jurisdiction of
courts-martial to specific non-capital civil offenses, regardless of whether
the acts took place in time of war or not.23 These Articles also provided
that the capital crimes of rape and murder, if committed outside the United
States, could be tried by a court-martial during peacetime 2 4 Prior to this,
a court-martial had no peacetime jurisdiction over any capital civil offense.
The remaining limitation of court-martial jurisdiction, the jurisdiction over
capital crimes (murder and rape) committed within the United States dur-
ing peacetime, was removed by the adoption of the Uniform Code of Mil-
itary Justice of 1950.25 With respect to the concurrent jurisdiction of both
military and civilian courts, the working rule became whoever apprehended
the accused first could try him. Recently, however, the trend of Supreme
Court decisions has been to refuse to allow the enlargement of peacetime
jurisdiction of courts-martial. In United States, ex rel. Toth v. Quarles26
the Supreme Court struck down an attempt by the Air Force to court-
19. Ex parte King, 246 F. 868 (1917).
20. Articles of War of 1806, Article I, Sec. X.
21. Rev. Stat. Art. 58, § 1342 (1874).
22. Rev. Stat. Art. 59, § 1342 (1874).
23. Article 93, Articles of War of 1916, 39 U.S. Stat. 664.
24. Article 92, Articles of War of 1916, 39 U.S. Stat. 664.
25. U.CMJ. Arts. 118, 120, 10 U.S.C. §§ 918, 920 (1964).
26. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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martial a former member who had been discharged prior to his arrest by
military authorities. In Reid v. Covert27 the Court said that there is no
jurisdiction for a court-martial to try civilian dependents of servicemen
for capital crimes committed in time of peace, outside the borders of the
United States. In each of the above cases, the Court held the exercise of
jurisdiction violative of the sixth amendment. In a series of cases in 1960,
the Court held that in a non-capital offense committed by civilian depen-
dents of a serviceman 28 and in either capital or non-capital crimes com-
mitted by civilian employees of the Armed Forces20 a court-martial is
without jurisdiction to try the offenders. Relying on the principles of the
sixth amendment, the Court held that a court-martial cannot exercise juris-
diction over an individual who does not possess a "status" as a member
of the Armed Forces. These decisions can be viewed as an extension of the
doctrine first espoused in Ex parte Milligan30 in which it was held that a
military commission is without jurisdiction under martial law to try a
civilian resident for offenses in the nature of treason. In Duncan v. Kahana-
mokus ' the Court held that the trial of civilians by the military in Hawaii
could not be upheld under an executive proclamation of martial law. In
both these cases, the Court said that the alleged crimes could have been
tried in accordance with civil procedures in the civilian courts. In the 1960
group of cases, courts-martial were the only means provided by Congress
for the crimes involved therein . 2
Thus, the decision in the instant case is another in a line of recent
Supreme Court decisions limiting the jurisdiction of courts-martial to what
was intended by the Articles of War of 1776 and by the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1776. It reflects a growing trend of disenchantment with military
justice. The Court undoubtedly had these thoughts in mind in deciding
this case. The Court said:
We have held in a series of decisions that court-martial jurisdiction
cannot be extended to reach any person not a member of the Armed
Forces at the times of both the offense and the trial. Thus dis-
charged soldiers cannot be court-martialed for offenses committed
while in service. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
(1955). Similarly, neither civilian employees of the Armed Forces
overseas, McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham
v. tagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); nor civilian dependents of military
personnel accompanying them overseas, Kinsella v. Singleton, 361
U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), may be tried
by court-martial.
27. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
28. Kinsella v. United States, ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
29. McElroy v. United States, ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v.
Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
30. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
31. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
32. Congress may constitutionally provide, however, that such persons be tried in
federal district court. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73-74 (1941).
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These cases decide that courts-martial have no jurisdiction to
try those who are not members of the Armed Forces, no matter
how intimate the connection between their offense and the con-
cerns of military discipline.83
The Court, moreover, noted that even if courts-martial lack jurisdiction
over civilians, this does not imply that they have unlimited jurisdiction
over soldiers, regardless of the nature of the offense charged. Thus the ra-
tionale of the cases decided in 1960, based on the concept of "status," is
being discarded by the instant case. The Court, in answering the Govern-
ment's contention on this point, said that even though status is a necessary
element for jurisdiction, there are other factors which must be taken into
account, among them, the nature, time, and place of the offense.34 The
.Court traced the historical evolution of court-martial jurisdiction both in
England and the United States. It concluded that for a crime to fall within
military jurisdiction, it must be "service-connected, lest 'cases arising in
the land and naval forces or in the militia, when in actual service in time of
war or public danger,' be expanded to deprive every member of the armed
services of the benefits of an indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a
jury of his peers."35 As the Court pointed out, the facts of the instant case
reflect absolutely no connection between the military duties of the petitioner
and the crimes involved.36 The restrictions placed on the jurisdiction of
courts-martial were so erected to protect the rights of the individual. Even
though the Court of Military Appeals takes cognizance of some constitu-
tional rights of the accused, courts-martial as an institution are inept to deal
with the subleties of constitutional law. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Jus-
tices Stewart and White, dissented:
The Court has grasped for itself the making of a determination
which the Constitution has placed in the hands of the Congress, and
in so doing the Court has thrown the law in this realm into a de-
moralizing state of uncertainty.37
The dissent clings to the idea of "status" as determinative of court-martial
jurisdiction. In discussing Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, which gives
Congress the power to "make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces . . . ," the dissent says:
[T]his Court has consistently asserted that military "status" is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the exercise of court-martial
jurisdiction. The Court has never previously questioned what the
language of Clause 14 (Article I, Sec. 8) would seem to make
plain-that, given the requisite military status, it is for Congress
33. Instant case at 267.
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36. Instant case at 272, 273.
37. Id. at 275.
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and not the judiciary to determine the appropriate subject-matter
jurisdiction of courts-martial.8
The dissent traces the same historical evolution as the majority but reaches
the opposite conclusion. It relies on a theory of a "balancing of interests"8 0
and determines that there are in existence, strong governmental interests
that support the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over non-military
crimes. "The United States has a vital interest in creating and maintaining
an armed force of honest, upright, and well-disciplined persons, and in pre-
serving the reputation, morale, and integrity of the military services." 40 The
dissent then points out that misconduct by a soldier against a civilian will
bring discredit upon the service with which he is associated. 41 It also states
that whatever role an ad hoc judicial approach may have in some areas of
the law, the Congress and the military are at least entitled to know with
some certainty the allowable scope of court-martial jurisdiction. Otherwise,
the infinite permutations of possibly relevant facts are bound to create con-
fusion and proliferate litigation over the jurisdictional issue in each instance.
The dissenters are of the opinion that nothing in the language of the Consti-
tution justifies the uneasy state of affairs that the majority has created.42
The majority decision appears to be the right one, the one that appeals
to the layman, and the one that most effectively carries out the intent of
the Constitution. Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the
power to make rules, not to define military crimes and punish. Furthermore,
the rules must be for the government and regulation of the armed forces. The
fair import of this section is, therefore, not to authorize general criminal
jurisdiction over servicemen, but to make rules proscribing punishment for
offenses having a relationship with the armed forces. 4 This conforms with
the evolution of courts-martial in England and is consistent with the Ar-
ticles of War that were in effect in the United States until 1863. 4 4 It does
not appear reasonable that the petitioner's crime could be construed to have
a substantial bearing on the maintenance of good order or military discipline.
Perhaps an underlying reason for the Court's decision centered around the
locale of the case, i.e. Hawaii. During World War II, the military claimed
that the whole of the' Hawaiian Islands was a battle area thus giving the
military jurisdiction over civilians on the Islands. In Duncan v. Kahana-
moku45 this issue was raised. The Court however, rejected this contention in
restricting the areas to the military posts and the immediate adjoining areas.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 281.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 282.
42. Id. at 284.
43. Duke and Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of
Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VA--. L. REv. 435, 455-456 (1960).
44. Id.
49. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
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But the military was plentiful in Hawaii, and, primarily to ease the strain
on local police forces, military personnel arrested for civilian crimes were
usually turned over to the military authorities. This custom continued after
the War until the present day. Hence, there exists a possibility that if this
case occurred on the continental United States, it would never have arisen
since the civilian courts would have exercised immediate jurisdiction over
the accused. The potential consequences of the decision are staggering. Pos-
sibly as many as 500,000 courts-martial convictions could be, affected, and it
could change the military's control over its personnel while they are off-base.46
It should be noted that the Court did not define the term "service-con-
nected;" accordingly, the decision will be subject to varying interpretations,
ranging from all crimes committed off-base, including crimes routinely han-
dled by the military, such as drunkenness, to crimes with almost identical
circumstances as the instant case. 47 Also of interest is whether or not the
decision will be applied retroactively. It remains for the future and for the
second wave of cases to reach the courts for these questions to be answered
and to see what direction the lower courts will take in their interpretation of
O'Callahan. Probably, as a matter of practicality and administrative feasibil-
ity, the courts will narrowly interpret O'Callakan to avoid being swamped
with future cases.
BRucE R. FENWICIC'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WARRANTLESS SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAW-
FUL ARREST MUST BE LIMITED TO AREA WITHIN SUSPECT'S CONTROL
Police officers went to the home of defendant, Chimel, with a warrant for
his arrest for burglarizing a coin shop. No search warrant had been issued. The
officers waited for his return and presented him with the arrest warrant. Not-
withstanding Chimel's objection, the officers searched his house. During the
search, under the direction of the police officers, Chimel's wife opened drawers
and moved the contents thereof so that the officers might view any items that
might have been taken during the burglary. The search included Chimel's three-
bedroom home, as well as his attic, garage and small workshop. After the search,
which lasted for more than forty-five minutes, the officers seized coins, medals
and tokens which were found in Chimel's home. At petitioner's subsequent trial
on two counts of burglary, the items taken from his house were admitted into
evidence against him over his objection that they had been unconstitutionally
seized, and he was convicted. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by both
the California District Court of Appeals1 and the California Supreme Court.2
46. See The National Observer, Sept. 22, 1969, at p. 2, col. 4.
47. Id.
1. 61 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1967).
2. 68 Cal. 2d 436, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421, 439 P.2d 333 (1968).
407
